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Abstract 
This is one of the first researches on price differentials of green buildings in 
Asia. Using a rich set of data on condominium transactions and mandatory 
evaluation of environmental performance in Tokyo, we estimate the effects of 
itemized green scores on transaction prices. Although green condominiums are 
on average traded at a premium, the premium is mainly attributed to the 
building age and quality. After controlling for relevant attributes, we find 
significant price discounts for newly constructed green condominiums. 
However, green condominiums experience little depreciation at least during the 
initial years. Using itemized scores, we find that the long-life design mitigates 
price discounts, but other factors such as the use of eco-friendly materials, 
renewable energy, water reuse, and greening exacerbate discounts. Several 
possibilities are discussed including high future maintenance costs of green 
condominiums. (JEL: Q51, R31) 
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I.  Introduction  
The green building is a concept for buildings with better environmental 
performance. Green buildings typically emit less carbon dioxide (CO2). They 
have been drawing more attention in recent years because construction and 
operation of real estate account for a large share of total CO2. In Japan, about 
40% of total CO2 emission is generated by the whole life cycle of real estate. 
(Architectural Institute of Japan, 2000)  
The definition of green buildings varies by the evaluation system. In 
some systems it is defined merely by energy efficiency, but in others it is 
defined by a combination of various sustainability factors. For example, many 
green labeling systems such as LEED in the United States, CASBEE in Japan, 
and Tokyo Green Building Program used in the present research, construct 
comprehensive measures of environmental quality of real estate. Some of green 
factors are not directly linked to CO2 emission. 
 An important question about green buildings is whether and how their 
“greenness” is priced in the market. If green buildings are traded at sufficiently 
high prices, developers would build such buildings for profit. Then the 
transform of existing stock of real estate into green stock will be made 
smoothly by the market mechanism under the current institutional setting. If 
not, much stronger policy measures or further changes in consumers’ 
consciousness are called for.  
 There are several potential sources of value premium for green buildings. 
The first is cost savings from purely technological reasons. If better heat 
insulator and more energy-efficient equipments are used in a building, they 
reduce operating expenses of the building. The reduced costs will be shared by 
the buyer and the seller with a certain ratio. The seller gets her share from a 
higher price, which compensates for increased costs of the green development. 
The second source is cost savings from public policy programs. The price can 
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reflect not only current programs but also future ones. The third source is 
increased revenue for commercial buildings or owner’s greater utility for 
residential buildings. Tenants of commercial buildings may be willing to pay 
higher rents if the use of green buildings is an important component of their 
corporate social responsibility. Home buyers may also be willing to pay higher 
prices if they are more satisfied by residing in green residential units.  
 However, the flip side is that there may be price discounts if these 
sources are negatively combined; prices will be lower if green features increase 
costs without much savings, public programs are not effective enough, and 
consumers of building services are not willing to pay enough. 
In this research we study what kind of “greenness” is valued in real 
estate markets by using condominium data in Tokyo Metropolitan Area in 
Japan. We combine a rich set of data on condominium transactions with 
detailed evaluation of environmental performance that is mandated by Tokyo 
Metropolitan government. This is one of the first academic researches on price 
differentials of green buildings in Asia. In particular, this is the first in the 
world to estimate effects of green labeling by different factor of environmental 
scores. 
More specifically, we first examine whether environmental evaluation 
under Tokyo Green Building Program generates any price differentials. In 
estimating the effect of green condominium indicator, we explore different 
controls for building characteristics and different specifications. Furthermore, 
we construct itemized relative scores in eight fields of environmental 
evaluation to estimate effects of environmental friendliness by field.  
We find that green condominiums are on average traded at a premium if 
building characteristics are not controlled for, but the premium is mainly 
attributed to the building age and quality. After controlling for relevant 
attributes, we find significant price discounts for newly constructed green-
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labeled condominiums. The negative effects range from 6% to 11%. However, 
green condominiums experience little depreciation at least during the initial 
years. 
Regarding estimates for itemized scores in green evaluation, we find 
that the long-life design and mitigation of the heat-island phenomenon reduce 
price discounts. However, other items such as the use of eco-friendly materials, 
renewable energy, water reuse, and greening exacerbate price discounts. We 
estimate that a newly constructed green condominium with median green 
scores is traded roughly at 11% discount. 
An explanation is based on user costs including those for maintenance 
and replacement of equipments. The long life design lowers user costs for the 
owner. The benefit can be significant in Japan where the average life of 
buildings is short. In contrast, greening, the use of eco-friendly materials, and 
water reuse may significantly increase future operating expenses and capital 
expenditures. Such benefits and costs in the future would be capitalized into 
the initial price of a condominium. 
The price discount indicates that homeowners are not yet willing to pay 
significantly higher prices for living in green condominiums. It also shows that 
the current and expected future policy measures do not create a significant 
benefit for green condominiums at this moment. Much stronger policy 
measures are called for in order to overcome price discounts and even generate 
price premia for autonomous diffusion of green buildings. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II is the review of related 
literature. In Section III, we summarize data for transaction prices and green 
building evaluation used in the study. Section IV presents the empirical 
analysis and discussion of the results. Section V concludes. 
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II.  Literature  
More cases studies and research reports on green buildings are published as 
concerns on global warming increase. However, the majority of previous 
researches is non-academic ones from engineering perspectives, and focuses 
more on cost issues than on values.  
For example, California’s sustainable building task force (2003) conducts 
case studies of 33 buildings on technical aspects of green buildings. Urban 
Land Institute publishes a number of books on green buildings on costs of 
construction and operation.  
Some industry researches deal with values of and returns to green 
buildings. (Pramerica Real Estate Investors, 2007; RREEF, 2007, 2008, 2009; 
USGBC, 2008) Although some positive results on green building investments 
are presented, the research methodologies are not necessarily satisfactory. 
 Our research is one of two first researches on a comprehensive measure 
of green buildings, which is not restricted to energy efficiency. The other 
research is done by Yoshida, Quigley, and Shimizu (2010) who use a different 
set of data and analyze how itemized scores in Tokyo Green Labeling System 
for Condominiums and CASBEE are associated with differentials in asking 
price of new condominiums. They find that developers add a 4.7% premium on 
asking prices of newly constructed green condominiums. The asking price is 
discounted by about 5% when condominiums are actually sold for both green 
and non-green ones. They do not find that the premium completely disappears 
after sale negotiations; i.e., a part of the premium remains in transaction prices. 
The different result may be arising due to the limited number of transaction 
sample in their study. 
Closely related researches are the following. By using an energy 
efficiency measure, Dian and Miranowski (1989) reports that energy efficiency 
leads to a higher residential price. More recently, Brounen and Kok (2009) 
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analyze the effect of an energy-saving label in the Netherlands on transaction 
prices of housing. They find about 3% premium in prices after controlling for 
location and building quality.  
On office buildings, Eichholtz et al. (2010) study US office markets by 
using data from Energy-Star and LEED. They find about 3% rent premium for 
694 green office buildings after controlling for differences in quality and 
location. Fuerst and Patrick (2008) and Miller et al. (2008) also use Energy-
Star and LEED data to find premia in rents or prices.  Miller et al. (2008) find 
no rent premium but 6% to 10% premium on transaction prices. Fuerst and 
Patrick (2008) report about 5% premium in rents and 30% premium in 
transaction prices. Although LEED is a comprehensive evaluation system for 
green buildings, they do not provide analysis of itemized effects. 
 
III.  Data  
A.  Tokyo Building Environmental Plan 
The Tokyo Metropolitan Government launched its Basic Plan for 
Environmental Protection in 1997, and enacted the Tokyo Metropolitan 
Environmental Security Ordinance in 2000. 1  Based on the ordinance, the 
government launched Tokyo Green Building Program in 2002, which was 
reinforced in 2005, 2007, and 2009.2 The amendment in 2005 includes the 
creation of Tokyo Green Labeling System for Condominiums, by which the 
developer of a large-scale condominium project is required to announce its 
itemized green scores to potential buyers. 
                                            
1 The ordinance No. 215, whose formal name is, “Tomin no Kenko to Anzen wo Kakuho Suru Kankyo ni 
Kansuru Jourei.” 
2 Tokyo Green Building Guidelines are published in Tokyo Metropolitan Notification No. 384 on March 28, 
2002. See http://www2.kankyo.metro.tokyo.jp/sgw/English/Tokyo%20Green%20BUilding%20Program.pdf 
for more information. 
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The purpose of the program is to require large building owners to submit 
Tokyo Green Building Plan and announce the submitted plan and related 
materials on Tokyo Metropolitan Government’s website and thereby to 
encourage building owners to carry out voluntary environment-conscious 
efforts and create a market that would highly rate environmentally sound and 
high-quality buildings and structures. 
A building owner is subject to the ordinance if the owner intends to newly 
construct or expand a building whose total floor space exceeds 10,000 m2. 
Regardless of whether the building owner is in the private sector or in the 
public sector, the ordinance applies to all categories of buildings including 
residential buildings and office buildings. The total floor space is calculated for 
each building, and the building owner does not have to add up the floor spaces 
of all buildings in the same promises. As of January 28, 2010, 1,154 buildings 
are evaluated under the program. 
 A big advantage of Tokyo Green Building Program for this research is 
that the program is mandatory to new construction or renovation exceeding 
10,000 m2 in floor area. Therefore, unlike other green labeling systems on 
voluntary basis, Tokyo’s program is in principle free from the sample selection 
problem. Another advantage is that the Tokyo government publishes itemized 
scores in eight fields: 1) reduction of thermal loads, 2) use of renewable energy, 
3) energy-saving, 4) use of eco-friendly materials, 5) longer life of the building, 
6) water circulation, 7) greening, and 8) mitigation of the heat island 
phenomenon. A building is given one points to four points in each field. The 
maximum points are different in each field and can be changed at each 
amendment.  
 In our analysis, we first construct an indicator variable that identifies 
whether a building is evaluated under Tokyo Green Building Program or not: 
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I୥,୧ ൌ ቄ1 if Building i is evaluated,0 otherwise.  
 
Next we construct a measure of relative scores for evaluated buildings in 
each of the eight fields described above. The maximum possible points are 
different by field. In some fields score is either 1 or 2, but in other fields score 
can be 1, 2, 3, or 4. As a result, 1 point in a field can be different from 1 point in 
other fields. Therefore, we construct the relative score by dividing raw score by 
the maximum possible score in each field. If Building i gets a raw score of S୫,୧ 
in Field m, in which the maximum possible score is S୫, the relative score, L୫,୧, 
is defined as L୫,୧ ൌ S୫,୧ S୫⁄ .  
In addition to the relative score, we construct indicator variables for 
each relative score. It is because the scores in the program are not cardinal. 
The relative scores should be interpreted as categorical variables. If there are 
N୫ distinct values of relative scores in Field m, and if L୫,୧ for Building i is the 
n-th lowest value in the field, the indicator variable, I୫୬,୧, equals to unity. That 
is,  
 
I୫୬,୧ ൌ ൜1 if L୫,୧ is the n‐th lowest value in Field m, 0 otherwise,  
for m ൌ 1, … ,8; n ൌ 1, … , N୫ 
 
B.  Transaction Price Data 
 
The transaction price data of condominium units in Tokyo are obtained from 
the Transaction Price Information Service (TPIS) that is jointly managed by 
the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism (MLIT) and 
Tokyo Association of Real Estate Appraisers (TAREA). The TPIS provides 
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transaction price information and associated attributes such as location, size, 
zoning and property use. The MLIT produces the information by combining 
three data sources: 1) the registry data obtained from the Ministry of Justice 
(MOJ) on transactions of raw land, built property, and condominiums, 2) 
survey results answered by property buyers, and 3) field survey conducted by 
real estate appraisers. 
A unique advantage of the TPIS data is their quality. The data set 
contains extremely rich set of property attributes. The data set is a 
combination of three distinct data sources, which allows us to check the 
consistency and accuracy of the data.  
 The data collection scheme is the following. The MOJ, which administers 
the national real estate registration system, provides MLIT the updated 
information on ownership transfers.3 The MOJ’s registry information includes 
location, plot number, type of land use, area, dates of receipt and contract, and 
name and address of the new owner. However, the registry does not record 
transaction prices. For each record on the registry, the MLIT sends 
questionnaires to each of the new owners and collects information on the 
transaction price, property size, and reason of the transaction. Based on the 
collected data, real estate appraisers conduct field survey on each property to 
record necessary information for appraisal such as building height, frontal road, 
distance from the nearest station, site shape, and land use. The information is 
finally compiled by MLIT.  
 The process typically takes three months. For example, registry data of 
April 2008 are obtained from the Ministry of Justice at the end of May 2008, 
and questionnaires are posted to buyers at the beginning of June 2008, which 
are to be collected by the end of the same month. A small portion of the cases 
                                            
3 There are ten different kinds of real property rights to be registered: exclusive and absolute right to real 
property, right to superficies, easement right, permanent tenancy right, preferential right, pledge right, 
mortgage right, leasehold right, stone-quarrying right, and redemption right.  
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(about 3% of the total) are omitted after the merged data are checked. Cases 
are omitted if field survey results are obviously different from questionnaire 
results or if the property size is below 10 m2. 
For example, between July 2005 and December 2007, 6.3 million 
transfers of ownership are registered for land, built property, and condominium 
ownership, of which 1.34 million transfers are subject to the MLIT survey. 
Eventually, 334 thousand replies are collected (29.2 % collection rate), and 220 
thousand records are published after excluding errors.  
In the original sample of condominiums in Tokyo, 41,560 transactions 
are included between 2002 and 2009. However, in a part of the sample, some 
necessary information is missing. After removing incomplete observations, we 
maintain 34,862 observations. 
The data set includes very rich information on the attributes of 
condominium units and buildings. After dropping the variables that contain 
significant number of missing values, we use the variables that are listed in 
Table 1. The dependent variable is logarithm of price per square meter. The 
explanatory variables are classified into five categories: 1) room attributes, 2) 
transaction characteristics, 3) location, 4) building size, and 5) building quality. 
It is noteworthy that we include indicator variables for jurisdictions and 
railway lines as location variables in order to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity in location. The jurisdiction is as important in Tokyo as 
anywhere else because of local public services, amenities, and local taxes. But 
the railway line is also important in Tokyo because frequent use of railway 
system creates railway-based communities and railway-based residential 
sorting. Transaction timing is also controlled for by indicator variables for 
quarter-year of transaction. 
11 
 
Table 1: List of explanatory variables 
 
Variable 
Unit/Category 
1) Room attributes  
 Log floor area ln (m2) 
 Floor number  
 Floor plan  Indicators for 1K, 1DK, 2DK, 1LDK, 2LDK, 3LDK, & 4-LDK  
2) Transaction   
 Transaction quarter Indicators for quarter-year of transaction 
 Buyer type Indicators for individual, company, real estate firm, and public 
entity 
 Seller type Same as above 
3) Location  
 Jurisdiction  Indicators for 23 wards and cities 
 Station Size Number of railway lines coming to the nearest station 
 Railway Line  Indicators for railway lines 
 Distance to Station Road distance in kilometers  
 Zoning Indicators for neighborhood commercial, commercial, exclusive 
industrial, industrial, quasi industrial, low-rise residential 1, 
low-rise residential 2, medium-to-high-rise residential 1, 
medium-to-high-rise residential 2, residential 1, residential 2, 
and quasi residential. 
 Maximum Building 
Coverage Ratio 
%, as defined by zoning regulation 
 Maximum Floor-to-
Area Ratio 
%, as defined by zoning regulation 
4) Building Size  
 Lot area Square meters 
 Number of units Number of units in the building 
 Stories above ground Number of stories above ground 
 Stories below ground Number of stories below ground 
5) Building Quality  
 Building structure Indicators for steel-reinforced concrete, reinforced concrete, 
steel, wooden, and blocks 
 Building age Years after completion of the building 
 Superintendent Indicator for having superintendents 
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Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics for samples with and 
without the green evaluation. The left column is for non-green condominiums 
and the right column is for green condominiums. It is clear that green 
condominiums are traded at significantly higher prices. The mean transaction 
price of green condominiums is 56 million yen, which is more than the double of 
27 million yen for non-green condominiums. However, green condominium 
units also have larger floor area. After computing unit prices per square meter 
of floor area, the price differential shrinks but still remains.  
Green condominiums are also taller (Stories above ground), have larger 
lot (Lot area), have more units (Number of units), and younger (Building age). 
These differences in size and quality must be responsible for the price 
differential. It is important to control for quality differences carefully in order 
to isolate price differentials of green buildings. 
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IV.  Empirical Analysis by Hedonic Approach 
A.  Hedonic Model 
 
We adopt hedonic approach to the estimation of the green effect on transaction 
prices. The hedonic approach is theoretically formalized by Rosen (1974), and is 
widely used in the study of real estate valuation. The idea is to regard housing 
as a bundle of characteristics such as lot size, building size, and location. Then 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Variables mean standard deviation median mean 
standard 
deviation median
Transaction Price (yen) 2.72E+07 3.03E+07 2.27E+07 5.58E+07 5.52E+07 4.50E+07
Price (yen) per sq. m. 645500.0 482025.2 559451.5 772572.5 551089.2 711700.2
ln (Price per sq. m.) 13.2207 0.5772 13.2347 13.4681 0.3846 13.4754
Floor area (sq. m.) 0.4620 0.3086 0.4760 0.7255 0.4081 0.7201
ln (Floor area) -0.9393 0.5956 -0.7423 -0.3683 0.2917 -0.3284
Floor number 5.4662 4.6918 4 12.1841 10.0357 9
Station size (number of lines) 1.5302 1.1620 1 1.8132 1.3746 1
Distance to station (100m) 0.6173 0.4764 0.5200 0.6913 0.4736 0.6300
Max. building coverage ratio 0.6959 0.2165 0.6 0.6493 0.0956 0.6
Max. floor to area ratio 3.5357 1.5707 3 3.4056 1.4342 3
Lot area 0.3181 0.8961 0.0836 1.2491 1.1884 0.8499
Number of units 0.0995 0.1881 0.0530 0.4220 0.3227 0.3380
Stories above ground 9.7571 6.3896 9 23.7208 12.5745 20
Stories below ground 0.2491 0.5545 0 0.9524 0.9625 1
Building age 12.8447 11.0860 10 1.8116 2.1724 1
Superintendent 0.8921 0.3102 1 0.9959 0.0637 1
Non-Green Condominiums Green Condominiums
Number of observations: 33,390 Number of observations: 1,472
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under some conditions, it is shown that housing prices in spatial equilibrium 
implicitly reveal a real-valued pricing function pሺܢሻ ൌ pሺzଵ, … , z୬ሻ relating prices 
and the n-vector of characteristics, z. Then, the market price associated with 
characteristic, z୧ , holding all else constant, is given by ∂p ∂z୧⁄ , assuming 
continuity of z୧ and differentiability of p. 
We investigate how green buildings are evaluated in the market in two 
ways. First, we estimate the effect of being evaluated in Tokyo Green Building 
Program on transaction prices. The indicator variable, I୥,୧, defined in Section 
III is used as the indicator for the green building. Second, we estimate effects of 
itemized scores in the program by using indicator variables, I୫୬,୧, that are also 
defined in Section III. 
 
B.  Analysis by Green Building Indicator 
 
In our first analysis using the green indicator, we estimate six variations of the 
following model by with different control variables. The logarithm of 
transaction price of Room j in Building i at Time t (ln P୧୨୲) is regressed on a 
constant, the indicator variable, I୥,୧, and various hedonic characteristics, X୩୤,୧୨୲. 
Category k, k ൌ 1, … ,5 , contains F୩  variables indexed by f . The hedonic 
characteristics variables X include indicator variables for jurisdiction and 
railway to control for unobserved heterogeneity in location.  
 
ln P୧୨୲ ൌ b଴ ൅ b୥I୥,୧ ൅ ෍ ෍ b୩୤X୩୤,୧୨୲ 
Fౡ
୤
ହ
୩ୀଵ
൅ ε୨୲                  ሺ1ሻ 
 
The first variation does not include any attribute in order to measure 
mean difference between green buildings and non-green buildings. We add one 
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category of attributes at a time; only room characteristics are included in the 
second variation, room and transaction characteristics are included in the third 
variation, and so on. The sixth version is the full model under this specification.  
Table 3 presents the OLS regression results for the green building 
indicator. Column (1) reports the results for the first variation, in which no 
hedonic characteristics are included. The estimated green coefficient, b୥෢ , 
represents the mean difference between the green condominiums and the non-
green ones when differences in hedonic characteristics are ignored. The green 
condominiums are on average traded for about 26% higher prices. As more 
hedonic characteristics are added in Column (2) through Column (5), the 
adjusted R-squared increases while the green coefficient gradually decreases. 
In Column (5), the green coefficient is reduced to 0.1984, but remains 
significantly positive, when 166 explanatory variables are used including 
indicators for jurisdictions and railways. 
When the variables for building quality are included, the result 
fundamentally changes even though only one numeric variable and four 
indicator variables are added. In Column (6), the green coefficient turns to 
negative (-0.0563), which is statistically significant at 1% level, and the 
adjusted R squared jumps up to 0.637. This result suggests that the estimated 
green coefficient is significantly affected by correlations between the building 
quality variables and the green building indicator. Without controlling for 
building quality, the estimated coefficient for the green indicator is subject to 
the omitted variables bias. After controlling for building quality, green 
condominiums are found to be traded for about 5.6% lower prices. We will 
discuss this negative effect after presenting the results of robustness checks 
and the estimation results of itemized effects. 
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Table 3: Regression Results on the Green Building Indicator 
(dependent variable: logarithm of price per square meter) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
܊܏෢ (Green 
Building) 
0.2626*** 
(0.0104) 
0.2590***
(0.0096) 
0.2384***
(0.0102) 
0.2176***
(0.0089) 
0.1984*** 
(0.0099) 
-0.0563***
(0.0084) 
Controls       
Room - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Transaction  - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location - - - Yes Yes Yes 
Bldg. size - - - - Yes Yes 
Bldg. 
quality - - - - - Yes 
Constant 13.2107*** (0.0030) 
13.2977***
(0.0531) 
13.1645***
(0.0540) 
13.3578***
(0.0611) 
13.3870*** 
(0.0593) 
14.0386***
(0.0513) 
Adjusted R2 0.00788 0.186 0.242 0.445 0.455 0.637 
Number of 
explanatory 
variables 
1 11 36 162 166 171 
N 38680 37917 37914 37906 35927 34862 
The table summarizes the estimation results of six variations of Equation (1) for 
different control variables. The White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are 
in parentheses. Significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels are indicated by *, **, and 
***, respectively. Location controls include indicator variables for jurisdictions and 
railway lines. The timing of transaction is controlled by quarter-year dummies in 
transaction controls.  
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The signs of estimated coefficients for other control variables, which are 
provided on the author’s website, are generally as expected.4 For the full model 
shown in Column (6), the transaction price per square meter is higher if the 
unit is on a higher floor (0.0068 per floor), the unit is smaller (0.0752 per log 
floor area), the unit is a one-room type, the condominium is closer to a railway 
station (0.1316 per kilometer), the nearest station has more railway lines 
(0.0183 per line), zoning is residential, there are superintendents (0.0413), the 
seller is a real estate firm or a company, and the buyer is an individual. 
 
C.  Robustness Checks and Additional Findings 
Now we conduct additional investigations and robustness checks of the 
previous result that green buildings negatively affect transaction prices. First, 
we separate each variable for building quality to see which quality variable 
affects the green coefficient most. The building quality variables are building 
age, building structure, and superintendent.  
 Second, we estimate the full model with all the attributes by Least 
Absolute Deviation (LAD) method in order to reduce the influence of outliers on 
the estimation.5 The LAD estimator is a median estimator and is less affected 
by the skewness or fat tails of the disturbance distribution. Third, we estimate 
the full model in the sub-sample in which one-room units are excluded. One-
room units are often built and sold for rental purposes, and those units could be 
traded for quite different motivations. We are concerned about the possibility 
that such non-standard units are driving the result.  
Given the result from the first robustness check that the building age is a 
critical attribute in estimation, we include, as the fourth variation, quadratic 
                                            
4 Please see www.personal.psu.edu/juy18. 
5 The LAD estimator in our application is the solution to the problem,  
minୠబ,ୠౝ,ୠౡ౜ ෍ ෍ ቮlnP୨୲ െ b଴ െ b୥I୥,୧ െ ෍ ෍ b୩୤X୩୤,୧୨୲
Fౡ
୤ୀଵ
ହ
୩ୀଵ
ቮ
୲୨
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terms of building age and building size.  This specification allows for non-linear 
relations between these variables and the log transaction price. Fifth, we 
include an interaction term of the green building indicator and building age to 
see if green buildings depreciate in a different manner. A different rate of 
depreciation may well arise because a longer life of a building is evaluated in 
Tokyo Green Building Program. Finally, we estimate the version with the 
interaction term in a subsample in which projects completed before 2003 are 
excluded. We limit the sample in order to focus on depreciation rates during 
early years and to better match the sample of green buildings with that of 
other buildings. Green condominiums are generally younger than seven years 
old since Tokyo Green Building Program has only eight years of history.  
Table 4 presents the results of robustness checks. A clear conclusion is 
that the estimated coefficient for the green building indicator is negative after 
building age is taken into account. We obtain even larger effects of green 
buildings on transaction prices when the model specification is more flexible in 
building age. 
Column (1), (2), and (3) compare which variable for building quality 
affects the estimated green coefficient most. We find that the building age is 
the key variable to be controlled for in estimating the green coefficient correctly. 
Without any variable for building quality, the estimate of the green coefficient 
is 0.1984 (Column (5) in Table 3.) The inclusion of building age changes the 
sign of the estimate to -0.570, which is close to the one in the full model. 
(Columin (1)) The inclusion of building structure variables also affects the 
estimate, but to a lesser extent. (Column (2)) The inclusion of superintendent 
indicator does not alter the estimate. (Column (3)) 
In column (4), we present the result estimated by LAD. Compared to the 
OLS estimate of -0.0563, the LAD estimate exhibits a larger effect of -0.0803. 
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Table 4: Robustness Checks of the Green Building Effect 
(dependent variable: logarithm of price per square meter) 
 
 
(1) 
Age 
only 
(2) 
Structure
only 
(3) 
Super- 
intendent 
(4)  
LAD 
 
܊܏෢ (Green Building) -0.0570***(0.0084) 
0.1326***
(0.0103) 
0.1996***  
(0.0100) 
-0.0803*** 
(0.0074) 
Controls     
Green building x 
building age - - - - 
Bldg. age -0.0261***(0.0002) - - 
-0.0255*** 
(0.0001) 
[Bldg. age]2 - - - - 
Bldg. structure - Yes - Yes 
Superintendent - - 0.0206** (0.0089) 
0.0256*** 
(0.0043) 
Room Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Transaction  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bldg. size Yes Yes Yes Yes 
[Bldg. size]2 - - - - 
Constant 13.7283***(0.3495) 
13.5718***
(0.0400) 
13.5145*** 
(0.0440) 
13.7762*** 
(0.0199) 
Adjusted R2 0.6363 0.4834 0.4573 0.445 
Number of 
explanatory 
variables 
167 169 167 176 
N 34862 34862 34862 34862 
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Table 4 (Continued): Robustness Checks of the Green Building Effect 
(dependent variable: logarithm of price per square meter) 
 
 
(5) 
Studios 
excluded 
(6)  
Quadratic 
size & age 
(7) 
Green  
x age 
(8) 
Since  
2003 
܊܏෢ (Green Building) -0.0757*** (0.0089) 
- 0.1206*** 
(0.0088) 
-0.1083*** 
(0.0100) 
-0.0604*** 
(0.0145) 
Controls     
Green bldg. 
x Bldg. age - - 
0.0279*** 
(0.0023) 
0.0392*** 
(0.0050) 
Bldg. age -0.0227*** (0.0002) 
-0.0456*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.0261*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0513*** 
(0.0028) 
[Bldg. age]2 - 0.0006*** (0.0000) - - 
Bldg. structure Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Superintendent Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Room Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Transaction  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bldg. size Yes Yes Yes Yes 
[Bldg. size]2 - Yes - - 
Constant 13.6603*** (0.0349) 
13.1473*** 
(0.0586) 
13.6920*** 
(0.0364) 
13.1537*** 
(0.0798) 
Adjusted R2 0.640 0.653 0.637 0.604 
Number of 
explanatory 
variables 
171 175 172 172 
N 24909 34862 34862 11703 
The table summarizes the estimation results of alternative specifications and 
robustness checks. The White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in 
parentheses. Significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels are indicated by *, **, 
and ***, respectively. Location controls include indicator variables for jurisdictions 
and railway lines. The timing of transaction is controlled by quarter-year dummies 
in transaction controls. Pseudo-R2 reported for LAD regression. 
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Therefore, the outliers and distributional irregularity are not producing the 
negative effect. Rather, such irregularity attenuates the estimate. 
In column (5), when we exclude one-room units from the sample, the 
estimate again exhibits a larger effect of -0.0757 than -0.0563 in the full sample. 
For standard-sized units of condominium, greenness is associated with a 
greater negative effect on price than for smaller one-room units. One-room 
units are in fact found to be different from other standard-sized units, but 
those units attenuate the negative effect. It may be the case that the green 
design does not create a big difference for smaller one-room units. 
In Columns (6), (7), and (8), the building age is treated with a greater care, 
given its importance in estimating the green coefficient. When we include 
quadratic terms of age and size variables in Column (6), the estimated green 
coefficient doubles to -0.1206. The quadratic term of building age is significant 
at 1% level and enters positively. The negative coefficient on age roughly 
doubles to -0.0456. This shows that the depreciation rates are not constant over 
ages but much faster for younger buildings. The omission of this nonlinear 
effect of age creates a systematic pattern in the error term such that younger 
buildings tend to have positive errors. The green condominiums, which are 
generally younger, are associated with the positive errors. Therefore, the 
estimated green coefficient is biased upward when nonlinearity of depreciation 
rates are omitted. We confirm this by doubling green coefficient.  
Column (7) shows the result when we include an interaction term of 
building age and the green indicator. Again we obtain a stronger effect of the 
green indicator, -0.1083. This value is the estimated green discount for new 
buildings when age equals to zero.  
An additional important finding is that depreciation rates are different for 
green condominiums. Non-green condominiums depreciate on average at about 
2.6% per year. In contrast, the depreciation rate of green condominiums is 
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about zero. The interaction term is positive 0.0279 and significant at 1%. The 
sum of the estimates for age and the interaction term becomes 0.0018, which 
cannot be distinguished from zero. Green condominiums are sold initially at 
11% discount, but do not depreciate much. Roughly four years later, the value 
of green condominiums exceeds that of non-green ones.  
Column (8) presents estimates of the differential depreciation rates in a 
restricted sample of being built after 2002. The result generally agrees to the 
previous one in Column (7). The depreciation rate for non-green condominiums 
becomes higher at about 5.1% per year during initial seven years. The estimate 
for the interaction term is again positive and significant at 1% level. The 
estimated depreciation rate for green condominiums is about 1.2%. The initial 
discount for green condominiums is reduced to about 6.0%. After five years 
from sale, the value of green condominiums exceeds that of non-green ones.  
 
D.  Analysis by Itemized Green Scores 
 
In this section we present estimation results for itemized green scores. As 
summarized in Section III, there are eight fields of criteria in Tokyo Green 
Building Program. We estimate coefficients of indicator variables for relative 
scores in each of eight fields, in addition to the green indicator. Since the 
baseline effect of green condominiums is captured by the green indicator, 
coefficients for itemized scores capture deviations from the baseline effect. The 
estimation equation is,  
 
ln P୧୨୲ ൌ b଴ ൅ b୥I୥,୧ ൅ ෍ ෍ b୫୬I୫୬,୧
Nౣ
୬ୀଶ
଼
୫ୀଵ
൅ ෍ ෍ b୩୤X୩୤,୧୨୲ 
Fౡ
୤
ହ
୩ୀଵ
൅ ε୨୲,                  ሺ2ሻ 
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where I୥,୧ is the green indicator, and I୫୬,୧ is the indicator variable that equals to 
unity if the relative score for Building i in Field m is the n-th lowest value for 
n ൌ 2, … , N୫. The lowest value is zero for each field. 
 Table 5 presents the estimation result. Estimated coefficients for 
itemized green scores are shown only if they are significant at 0.1 or lower. We 
estimate five variations of Equation (2). Columns (1) and (2) are results by OLS 
and LAD, respectively. Column (3) is the OLS result when quadratic terms of 
building age and building size variables are included. Column (4) is the OLS 
result when heterogeneous depreciation is allowed by including the interaction 
term between building age and the green indicator. Column (5) is the same as 
Column (4) except that the sample is limited to condominiums built since 2003. 
 Among eight fields of green investments, the longer life of building (i.e., 
m=5) exhibits very strong positive effects. In Column (1), estimated effects are 
about 0.134, 0.087, and 0.247 when relative scores are 0.33, 0.67, and 1, 
respectively. The positive effects are even larger in Column (3), (4), and (5) 
when the depreciation is better modeled. The median score in this field is 0.67, 
for which effects range from 0.087 to 0.347 depending on estimation.  
 Large positive effects are also found for the mitigation of heat-island 
phenomenon (i.e., m=8). For the relative score of 0.33, positive effects range 
from 0.151 in Column (5) to 0.262 in Column (4). However, there are only 102 
condominium units getting positive scores in this field, of which78 units, or 5% 
of total green units, get 0.33 points. Therefore, such strong positive effects do 
not affect the majority of green condominiums.  
 Other fields are generally associated with negative effects, which 
augment the negative baseline effect. In particular, effects of the use of eco-
friendly materials are important for the overall green effect because about a 
half of condominium units receive 0.5 points in this field. The units receiving 
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0.33 points are discounted by 0.050 to 0.098, and those receiving 0.5 points are 
discounted by 0.029 to 0.054 in addition to the baseline discount.  
 The water circulation is also associated with large negative effects. The 
estimated discounts range from 0.122 to 0.162 for those with full score, which 
account for 14% of green condominium units. The remaining 86% of green units 
receive either zero point or 0.5 point, in which case no additional discount is 
estimated.  
 The greening also tends to result in discounts. In Column (1), estimated 
effects range from -0.049 to -0.276. The estimated effects are stronger for the 
LAD estimation shown in Column (2) and for the model with quadratic terms 
shown in Column (3), but become insignificant in Columns (4) and (5).  
 The energy saving is also associated with large price discounts. 
Discounts range from -0.114 to -0.197 for 0.5 point, and from -0.108 to -0.124 
for 1 point. The effects tend to be stronger when the age variable is better 
modeled. The reduction of thermal loads and renewable energy do not exhibit 
consistent results across different variations. In most specifications, these 
effects are insignificant.  
 The baseline effect of green condominiums (the first row) is negative for 
each specification. At first glance, the effect looks stronger than in Tables 3 and 
4. However, the baseline effect cannot be directly compared with the green 
effect estimated without itemized scores. The baseline effect can be interpreted 
as price differential for a hypothetical green condominium that gets zero point 
in every field. 
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Table 5: Regression Results on Itemized Green Scores 
(dependent variable: logarithm of price per square meter) 
 Score (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
LAD 
(3) 
Quadratic 
Size & Age 
(4) 
Green  
x Age 
b୥෢ (Green Building)  -0.1125*** -0.0868 -0.1966*** -0.1888*** 
1. Reduction of thermal 
loads 
0.5 - - 0.0457* - 
1 - - - - 
2. Renewable energy 0.33 - 0.1481* - - 
0.5 -0.0379* - - - 
3. Energy saving 0.5 -0.1184* - -0.1143* -0.1148* 
1 -0.1082* - -0.1244** - 
4. Eco-friendly materials 0.33 -0.0642*** -0.0775*** -0.0977*** -0.0503** 
0.5 -0.0393** -0.0287* -0.0286* -0.0319* 
5. Longer life of building 0.33  0.1340*** - 0.1671*** 0.1542*** 
0.67  0.0869** - 0.1005*** 0.1099*** 
1  0.2468*** 0.1814* 0.2704*** 0.2830*** 
6. Water circulation 1 -0.1618*** -0.1224*** -0.1362*** -0.1483*** 
7. Greening 0.25 -0.2759*** -0.2953*** -0.3673*** -0.2273*** 
0.33 - -0.0469*** -0.0296* - 
0.67 - - - 0.0777* 
0.75 -0.1511** -0.1692** -0.2469*** - 
1 -0.0488** -0.0977*** -0.0438* - 
8. Mitigation of heat 
island 0.33 0.2453*** 0.1690*** 0.2272*** 0.2624*** 
Contols      
Green bldg x Bldg. age  - - - 0.0266*** 
Bldg. age  -0.0261*** -0.0255*** -0.0457*** -0.0261*** 
[Bldg. age]2  - - 0.0006*** - 
Bldg. structure  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Superintendent  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Room, transaction, and 
location  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bldg. size  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
[Bldg. size]2  - - Yes - 
Constant  13.6901*** 13.7713*** 13.7499*** 13.6897*** 1
Adjusted R2  0.638 0.5549 0.651 0.638 
Number of explanatory 
variables  194 199 198 195 
N  34859 34859 11700 34859 
The table summarizes the estimation results of Equation (2). Estimated coefficients 
for itemized scores are shown only if they are significant at 0.1 or lower. 
Significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels are indicated by *, **, and ***, 
respectively. The White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are used. 
Location controls include indicator variables for jurisdictions and railway lines. The 
timing of transaction is controlled by quarter-year dummies in transaction controls. 
Pseudo-R2 reported for the LAD regression. 
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 In Table 6, we compute the total green effect for a hypothetical 
condominium that gets median scores for all fields. Median scores for fields 1 
through 8 are 0.5, 0, 0, 0.5, 0.67, 0.5, 0.33, and 0, respectively. Median scores 
are almost identical to modes. In general, a negative baseline effect tends to be 
partially offset by a positive effect of longer life, but enhanced by negative 
effects of eco-friendly materials and greening.  
The total effect for the median condominium is -0.065 by OLS and -0.076 
by LAD. (Columns (1) and (2)) When quadratic terms for building age and 
building size are included, the total effect is magnified to -0.109. (Column (3)) 
When the interaction term between building age and the green indicator is 
included, the total effect becomes -0.111, which does not change even if we limit 
the sample to condominiums built since 2003. The results are consistent to 
each other in Columns (3), (4), and (5) when the age-related depreciation is 
better modeled.  
Finally, estimated results on depreciation are similar to those in Tables 
3 and 4; green condominiums are less subject to depreciation. With a constant 
and homogeneous depreciation rate assumed in Columns (1) and (2), the 
annual depreciation rate is about 2.6%. When age-dependent but homogeneous 
depreciation rates are introduced by the quadratic term, the initial 
depreciation rate is about 4.6% but rates become lower with age. For a 10 year-
old building, the depreciation rate becomes about 3.5%.6 When heterogeneous 
depreciation rates are allowed in column (4), the average rate is about 2.6% for 
non-green condominiums, but about 0% for green ones. When the sample is 
limited to newer condominiums, the average depreciation rate becomes about 
5% for non-green ones and 1.5% for green ones. (Column (5)) 
 
                                            
6  Based on the estimates in Column (3), the marginal depreciation rate for X year-old building is -0.0457 
+ 0.0006X.  
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E.  Discussion 
 
The results from itemized scores are summarized as follows. Overall, green 
condominiums are traded at a discount. However, those having a long-life 
design and contributing the mitigation of heat-island phenomenon are 
associated with smaller price discounts. Those using eco-friendly materials, 
circulating water, providing more green areas, and having energy saving 
features are associated with greater price discounts. What is the reason for 
such different effects by item? 
Table 6: Effects for a Condominium with Median Scores 
 
 Median
Score 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
LAD 
(3) 
Quadratic 
Size & Age 
(4) 
Green  
x Age 
1. Reduction of thermal 
loads 0.5   0.0457  
2. Renewable energy 0     
3. Energy saving 0     
4. Eco-friendly materials 0.5 -0.0393 -0.0287 -0.0286 -0.0319 
5. Longer life of building 0.67 0.0869  0.1005 0.1099 
6. Water circulation 0.5     
7. Greening 0.33  -0.0469 -0.0296  
8. Mitigation of heat 
island 0     
(A) Sum of itemized 
scores  0.0476 -0.0756 0.088 0.078 
(B) Baseline effect  -0.1125  -0.1966 -0.1888 
Total effect (A+B)  -0.0649 -0.0756 -0.1086 -0.1108 
Note: The itemized effects and baseline effect are regarded as zero if significance 
level is lower than 0.9. 
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A leading explanation is based on future maintenance costs. If a feature of 
a condominium incurs higher costs in maintenance and replacement of 
equipments, the owner rationally discounts the initial transaction price by 
subtracting the present value of future costs. 
A longer life should be associated with a higher sale price because owner’s 
costs of maintenance and renovation are significantly lower. The long life is 
especially effective in Japan where condominiums have relatively short 
economic lives. The estimated half life of condominium units is about 20 years 
though not reported in the paper. 
The use of eco-friendly materials can increase owner’s maintenance costs. 
The durability of eco-friendly materials can be less than that of standard 
materials, and it can be uncertain. If buyers expect higher maintenance costs 
due to frequent replacements of more costly eco-friendly materials, initial 
transaction prices can be discounted. 
The water circulation system also requires more costly maintenance. 
Additional machines and pipes need to be cleaned, fixed, and replaced more 
frequently. Similarly, the greening-related discount can also be understood by 
maintenance costs. A larger area with planting will cost owners for pruning 
and cleaning. 
 A puzzling result is for the energy saving. The energy saving equipments 
should lower the user cost of condominium owners, and thus it is more likely 
associated with positive effects. However, there are only 190 units, or 13% of 
total green units, that receive positive scores in this field. Given that energy 
saving equipments are adopted widely even for non-green condominiums, the 
energy saving criteria in the Tokyo Program may be too extreme. The required 
level of energy savings in the program may be exceeding the break-even point 
and resulting in a negative NPV. 
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 Another possible explanation is based on the omitted variables bias due 
to unobservable quality differences. A condominium may be developed as a 
green building in order to mitigate some negative factors in location or 
developer characteristics. For example, if the development site is former 
industrial site around which few green open spaces exist, the developer may 
choose to make the project green in order to mitigate the unattractiveness of 
the site. Another example is about developer’s negative characteristics. A less 
competitive or less creditworthy developer may choose to develop green 
condominiums in order to attract customers. Such less competitive developers 
may be associated with price discounts via some unobservable factors. If such a 
relation between unattractiveness and green developments systematically 
exists, the green indicator may pick up negative effects of such omitted 
negative characteristics. 
 On the first point on industrial sites, a massive amount of 
redevelopments of former industrial sites actually occurred during the sample 
period along newly opened Rinkai line in Koto ward. In our alalysis, we control 
for unobservable negative impacts of such developments by indicator variables 
for jurisdiction and railway line.  
 On the second point on developer characteristics, we do not have 
developer information on all condominiums, but we do have developer 
information on green condominiums. Based on casual investigations into 
names of developers of green condominium, we do not find systematic tendency 
that “low quality” developers develop green condominiums more frequently. 
Rather we frequently observe large and creditworthy developers. It seems more 
likely that developers of better quality are attenuating our negative estimates 
of the green effect.  
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V.  Conclusion  
 
We find that green buildings may well be associated with price discounts 
rather than premia. The value of green buildings critically depends on the 
definition of green buildings, institutional settings, policy package, and user’s 
preferences. Therefore, a particular result for a certain property type in a 
jurisdiction or a country cannot be generalized without a condition. For 
example, price premia that are reported in previous studies are mainly based 
on energy efficient buildings. More empirical studies for different property 
types in different areas are necessary in order to understand the value of green 
buildings. Our list of extensions includes a study on commercial buildings in 
Tokyo, and studies for other cities in Japan.  
We also find that different environmental items result in very different 
valuation. Each item is considered to have different effects in three dimensions; 
technological effects on costs, policy-oriented effects on costs, and user’s 
valuation. Our findings indicate that positive effects through policy and 
preferences are still limited while increased technological costs are directly 
capitalized. We conclude that much stronger policy measures are called for in 
order to overcome the price discounts and even generate price premia for 
autonomous diffusion of green buildings. 
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